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JOHN DOE     SEPT 15, 2017
JOHN DOE     SEPT 15, 2017

India-Pakistan Water Conflict: Impacts of the IWT Suspension (2025)

Assessing the Consequences of the Indus Waters Treaty Suspension

Introduction

The suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) by India on April 23, 2025, following a terrorist attack in Pahalgam, Indian-administered Kashmir, which killed 26 civilians, has escalated tensions in the India-Pakistan water conflict. The IWT, signed in 1960 and brokered by the World Bank, allocates the eastern rivers (Ravi, Beas, Sutlej) to India and the western rivers (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab) primarily to Pakistan, ensuring 80% of the Indus Basin’s flow (170 billion cubic meters annually) for Pakistan’s agriculture, hydropower, and water security.[1] India’s decision to place the treaty “in abeyance”—halting data sharing, inspections, and compliance with flow restrictions—responds to accusations of Pakistan’s support for terrorism, which Pakistan denies.[2] This webpage examines the impacts of the suspension on Pakistan and India, regional implications, and potential solutions.

Impacts on Pakistan

Pakistan, as the lower riparian state, is heavily dependent on the Indus Basin, which irrigates 16 million hectares, supports 30% of hydropower, and provides drinking water for over 240 million people.[3] The IWT suspension has severe consequences.

Agriculture and Food Security

  • Reduced Water Flows: India’s off-season sediment flushing at Salal and Baglihar dams on the Chenab in May 2025 reduced flows by up to 90% at key points, contributing to a 21% basin-wide water deficit. This threatens wheat and rice yields, with potential losses of 20–30%, risking food insecurity for millions in Punjab and Sindh, which produce 85% of Pakistan’s food.[4][5]
  • Irrigation Disruptions: The halt in data sharing (e.g., flood warnings, flow rates) disrupts irrigation planning, critical during the dry season. Farmers in Punjab reported sowing delays in May–June 2025, exacerbating groundwater depletion.[6]

Economic and Hydropower Impacts

  • Economic Losses: Agriculture contributes 25% to Pakistan’s GDP and employs 70% of its rural population. Water shortages could cost \$2–3 billion in crop losses by Q3 2025.[3]
  • Hydropower Strain: Reduced flows to dams like Tarbela and Mangla (11.6 million acre-feet capacity) threaten 30% of Pakistan’s power supply, causing outages in Lahore and Karachi.[7]

Water Security and Social Risks

  • Flood Damage: Unannounced monsoon releases from India’s Ravi and Chenab dams in July–August 2025 caused flooding in Punjab (e.g., Kartarpur, Sialkot), with economic damages estimated at \$1 billion and thousands displaced. Pakistan accuses India of deliberate “water aggression.”[8][9]
  • Health and Social Tensions: Polluted or delayed water increases waterborne diseases. Provincial disputes (e.g., Sindh vs. Punjab) over reduced flows risk internal conflict.[6]

Impacts on India

India’s upstream position provides strategic leverage but introduces vulnerabilities and risks.

Strategic Gains

  • Hydropower and Irrigation: Suspension allows India to accelerate four Chenab dams and expand run-of-the-river projects (e.g., Kishanganga), boosting power and irrigation in Jammu & Kashmir and Punjab. India plans to divert water to Rajasthan via new canals.[10]
  • Political Leverage: The suspension signals a hardline stance against terrorism, resonating domestically. PM Modi’s May 2025 statement, “India’s water will flow for India’s benefit,” aligns with calls to renegotiate the “generous” IWT.[11]

Vulnerabilities and Costs

  • Infrastructure Limits: India lacks storage to fully divert western rivers, with current dams designed for run-of-the-river use. Building reservoirs could take a decade.[12]
  • Environmental Impact: Sediment flushing silts Indian downstream areas, affecting Punjab agriculture. Climate change (30–40% flow reduction by 2050) threatens India’s water security.[13]
  • Geopolitical Risks: China, upstream on the Brahmaputra and Sutlej, could mirror India’s tactics, threatening northeastern India. Bangladesh and Nepal may distrust India’s water diplomacy.[2]

Regional and International Implications

The suspension has broader consequences for South Asia and global water governance.

  • Nuclear Risks: Pakistan’s April 24, 2025, statement labeling water diversion an “act of war” and hinting at “full spectrum” responses raises nuclear escalation fears.[14]
  • Legal Challenges: The IWT lacks a unilateral exit clause. The PCA’s June 2025 ruling upheld its jurisdiction, but India’s rejection limits enforcement. Pakistan seeks ICJ and World Bank mediation.[15]
  • Global Precedent: The UN and WHO warn that weaponizing water violates human rights and could inspire conflicts in regions like the Nile or Mekong.[16]
  • China’s Role: China, with investments in Pakistan’s hydropower (e.g., CPEC), may back Pakistan diplomatically, complicating India’s position.[11]

Recommendations

To mitigate the crisis and prevent escalation:

  • Revive Bilateral Talks: Engage through the World Bank to restore data sharing and inspections, reducing flood and drought risks.[17]
  • Update IWT for Climate: Establish joint monitoring to address glacier melt and flow variability (30–40% reduction by 2050).[13]
  • Regional Cooperation: Involve China and regional actors to ensure equitable water sharing, leveraging SAARC or UN frameworks.[18]
  • International Mediation: Strengthen PCA or ICJ roles to enforce compliance and rebuild trust.[19]

Conclusion

India’s suspension of the IWT in April 2025 has profound impacts, threatening Pakistan’s agriculture (20–30% yield losses), economy (\$2–3 billion in damages), and water security, while causing floods and social tensions. India gains hydropower and irrigation but faces infrastructure limits, environmental risks, and geopolitical backlash, particularly from China. The crisis risks nuclear escalation and sets a dangerous precedent for global water conflicts. Restoring dialogue, updating the IWT, and fostering regional cooperation are critical to de-escalate and ensure sustainable water management in South Asia.[2][20]

Sources